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# ARGUl\fENT

ThP /Jist rict Cottrt Had Jurisdiction To Foreclose
Res poud en t 's J nd [Jrl JJ/e nt Lien.

Tile first t·ontention utade and argued

h~'

appellants
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2
rs that a court of e4.uit~T is without ju~sdiction to fort•close a money judgnwnt lien against the Pstate of a
deceased ;judgment debtor.

ln proceeding under Sec-

tion 102-9-11 Lr.C.A. 1943*, respondent

expressl~T

waived

recourse against any other propert.v of the estate.
Although the section provides that ''an action

ma~·

be

brought without notice h)- an)- holder of a mortgage
or lien" without presentation of a daim,

appellant~

believe this section is lirnited by 102-9-10, which provides
that "Judg1nent against the decedent for the recovery
of money must be presented to the executor or administr·ator like any other claim".

They therefore contend

that a money judgment lien holder is limited to the
probate court for collection.

Since both of the fiections

provide for the presentation of clain1s to the personal
rep\sentatiYe, instead of 102-9-16 being a limitation

on "the other, tl1e latter is an exception to the rule of
the two sections.

Furthermore, the pertinent portion

of 102-9-16 makes reference to judgments for the
recovery of rnon'~y onl~· and not to judgment liens,
I

while the other section has reference to liens which,
unquestionahly, would inelude judgment liens. \rP
find no Ftah case in point and appellants cite none.
rPhe cases quoted from by appellants on pages 15 to
20 inclusive, are not in point. In the Bletcl1er case the
plaintiff had no lien. In the Nielsen t•ase a chattel
m0rtgage lien harl expired for failnn~ to n·new. In
*-All citations of statutes through hrief will be Utah Annotated. 1943
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3
the Gautier
tion

wa~

~-\ pparently

For this

(Okla.) the statute under considera-

siruilar to 10-l-31-1 and the case pertained only

situation~

to the

ority.

ea~e

Oklahoma has no statute si1nilar to 102-9-11.

ren~on

T~e

under whieh execution rnay issue.

the Fluke case (Okla.) is also no auth-

/{ ~gyin ea::;e (Fla.) also pertains to executio11s

and apparently Florida does not have a statute similar
to 102-9-11. The JJ ead case (Calif.) pertained to a contingent clann and no lien was involved. In the Delfelder·
cat-'e C\\~yo.) prmuissor~· notes were the basis of the
claim. In the Flynn case (Idaho) the clairn is for recovery of dmuages and breach of contract.
However, 102-9-11 is identical with California Prohate Code Section 716 and 102-9-16 is identical with
California Probate Code Section 732. It is quite obvious
that the r tah Statutes were patterned after the California Statutes and, it seems inevitable that the construction placed thereon by the Supreme Court of
California will be persuasive upon this Court. In Corpnrntion of America vs. Marks, 73 P. 2d 1215, the
Supreme Court of California made a very clear and
well-reasoned statement on the precise question, saying:
''Defendants contend that enforcernent of
the judgment lien in the course of the administration proceeding is the exclusive remedy of
the jndg-lll(-mt lien ereditor upon the death of
tl1e debtor prior to lev:· of execution.

If a
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judg~ment lien is enforceable only through the
probate proeeeding, and upon the filing of a claim
in that proceeding, it alone is singled out from
all other liens.
provision~

lien~,

Other

by virtue of the

of Section 716, Probate Code,

be enforced

again~t

ma~·

the property subject to the

lien, waiving recourse against other property,
notwithstanding the time for filing a claim there·
on ha~ expired and the estate has been closed.
Dre.d'uss v. Giles, supra; Uerman Sav. & L. Soc.
v. Fisher, supra; Visalia Bank v. Curtis, supra.
The heirs and distributPes take subject to such
liens. We can pen·eive of no reason why the
Legislature should wish to single out judgment
liens for separate, less favorable treatment. 'A
judgment lien has always been regarded as the
highest form of securit~r.' l\lorton v. Adams.
124 Cal. 229, 231, 56 P. 1038, 1039, 71 Am. St.
Rep. 53. It is a matter of publie record.
"We are of the view that section 716, Probate Code, applies to judgmentliens, and recognizes a right in the judgment lien creditor to
bring an equitable action to foreclose his lien on
the death of the judgment debtor.
uage of said seetion is broad.
':ivfortgages or liens.'

The lang-

It applies to

.As in the cast> of a mort-

ma~·
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gage lien, such an action

lH· brought during

5
the cour:sP of the adinini8tration prm·et>ding or
after the P:state has been distributed against
those \Yho haYe ~uc.ceeded to the property subject
to the lien; recoun~e against other property being
~el'tion

7:-t2, Probate Code, ter1ninates
the right to leY:' execution upon property subject
to the lien, but we find nothing in said section
excluding enforceu1ent of a judg1nent lien
through an equitable action brought to foreclose
it, which right is recognized as to mortgages and
other lien~ generally h:, section 716. There is
a difft>renee between an execution levy and sale
hy the ~heriff without prior court order, and a
foreclosure sale held pursuant to order of the
<·ourt iW an equitable action for foreclosure.

waived.

'' Tn thiH analysis, the requirement of section
7:32, Probate Code~ that 'a judgntent against the
deeedent for the recovery of rnoney must be filed
or presented in the same rnanner as other claims',
means that if the judgment lien creditor would
obtain paYJ.nent of his judgrnent through the
admini~tration proceeding, with a right to a
deficienc:· in tlw event the property subject to
the l iPn is insufficient to pay hi1n in full, he must
l'ilP a elain1 notwitlu..;tanding his debt has already
lH·<·n redw·<·<l to judgnwnt. This is the rule
wl1id1 appliP~ to mortgages and other liens."
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Appellants alt::lo t::ltate that it seeu1s to them that
102-9-11 applies only to tho~e liens which are specifi-

cally waived by the judgn1ent debtor or are exempt
frmn the provisions of 38-0-1.

rrhere is no basis for

reading into 102-9-11 either of the two limitations.
However, appellants exvress the fear that without so
liiniting the section, probate homesteads in 101-4-6 would
be defeated and the court would be unable to discharge
the preferences established under 102-9-22, particularly
liens upon the property set apart as a homestead. Appellants' fears are unfounded.

An equitable action on

a judgrnent lien ''upon the real property occupied, selected or set apart as a homestead" (102-9-22) would
not prevent the personal representative from paying
the debt any uwre than if the debt were secured by
a rnortgage.

The statute applies in exactly the same

1nanner to judgment liens as to mortgages.
Respondent Did Not HaL:e An Adequate Remedy At Law

Appellants contend that in any event a court of
equity cannot take jurisdiction because the judgment
creditor has an adequate remedy at law
execution and sale under 104-37-7, which

h~,

way of

provide~.

that:

"Notwithstanding the death of a party after
the judgment, execution may be issued or it
1nay be enforced, as follows: . . . if the judgnlcnt* i':-' for recovery of real or personal prop-

erty, or tile enforcement of a lien."
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Thi~

et>rtainly

doP~

7
not say that after the death of

a judgment debtor tht> judgntent 1nay not be enforced
by action.

The exac.t 1neaning of the section is sOlne-

wllat obscure but it ha8 its counterpart and predecessor
in Section 686, California Code of Civil Procedure. In
Corporation of America

l'S.

Jfarks, supra, the California

Supretne Court held that Section 732 of the Probate
CmJP

tenninate~

tion leYy and

the judgntent creditor's right to execu-

~ale

upon the death of the judgment

debtor, except where execution has been levied on the
debtor's property prior to his death. - The issuance
of execution provided for in 104-37-7 is effective only
"if the judgment be for the recovery of real ... prop-

erty" or, if the judgment is for "the enforcernent of
liens thereon".

Respondent's deficiency judgment tn

the foreclosure action was not a judgment for the

reeovery of real property nor for the enforcement of
a lien thereon. The judg1nent appealed from herein
is the judg1nent for the enforcement of a lien on
specific real property. California's related section, 686
C. C. P., was considered in Stanley v. Westover, 269 P.
468. The Court held, under facts very similar to the
ca~e at bar, that execution could not legally issue ancl
the sale was void. It was this case that persuaded
l'espondent that tl1P si1nple 1nethod of having execution
i~· IIPd ~hould not l>e attempted.
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Presentation Of A Clailll Is Not A Prerequisite
On pages 19 and 20 of their brief, appellants continue their a~ument to the effect that plaintiff failed
to allege that it had filed a claim, and that this was
fatal. The cases they quote from are not in point as
those plaintiffs had no liens, as heretofore shown.
Appellants continue to ignore the express exception in
102-9-11 pertaining to mortgages and liens. R-espondent does not contend that an un~eeured judgment may
he the basis for an equitable adion 'lvithout presenting
a cl~n, but stresses the fact that a judgment lien is
the subject matter of the instant case, and that such a
lien has the same status as a mortgage insofar as 1029-11 is coneerned. 104-30-1;> rnakes a judgment from
the tin1e it is docketed "a lien upon all the real property
of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution".
Res1Jondent 's judgment

wa~

docketed in the county in

which the .real property was located. It will be shown
later that the property was not exempt from execution.
The Supreme Court of Ftah recognized the exception in 102-9-11 where it said ''The material question,
and the one decisive in this case, is whether the Eccles
Lumber Company had a valid and subsisting lien." (In
Re Stone's Fjstate, -16 P. 1101.)
Section 102-D-+ proYides that ''nothing in this title
contained shall he so eonstrned as to prohihit the foreclmmn~

of liens or

mortg~1,~·ps

as hereinafter provided".
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9
Tt ·will he noted that 102-9-11 as wt'll a8 102-8-2, pertaining to suum1ary a(huini~tration and distribution of
~mall

p:-;tates. is .. in this title contained".

For Tl1e Pitrpu:it:s of Re;)jJUildent 's Action Its Judgment
Lien Did Sot E.rpi re At End of Eight Years.

Appellants next l'ontend that the lien of the judgment expired and ceased to be a

JJWn on

the 28th day of

:--;epten1her, 1946. The, basi8 for this is 104-30-15, which
prodde8 that a judgrnent lien shall continue for eight
year8. This, however, is not the only L'tah statute on
the subject . 104-2-21 provides that the period in
which an action on a judgn1ent shall cmnmence is eight
years. 104-37-6 provides that "In all cases the judgment nmy be enforced . . . after the lapse of eight
years ... b:~ judg1nent for that purpose . . . ". Respondent filed its action within the eight-year period,
and filed for record a notice of lis pendens. The action
wa~ for the foreclosure of its judgment lien.
Appellants rely on Smith z;. Sclw·artz, 60 P. 305.
decided b:r this Court in 1899. It was there indicated
that the lien period could not be extended under any
ti n·um~tances. The particular point does not appear
to have again been before this Court until January, 1948.
at which thne a broader and much nwre reasonable
construction wa~ given and it was held that there are.
eircum~tmH'P~ where the lien may eontinue beyond the
l·ig·l! t ~·pars. F rt:e c. FarJucurtll, 188 P. 2d 731. The
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exception there involved was not the same as In the
instant case.

However, the basis for the rule IS the

smne in each case, that is, the ineffectiveness of an execution.

There it was held, although the Rf·gional

Agricultural Credit Corporation had the legal right to
have an execution issued, that it would have been u~c·
less to have done so. In the case at bar, respondent
could not, at the ti1ne it was decided that something
must be done to protect its lien, have execution issuerl
because of the death of the judgment debtor. (102-9-16.)
Appellants quote from decisions from other States
to the effect that "the filing of a complaint to foreclose
a lien in a court of equity does not extend the lien.
(Pages 23-25, Appellants' Brief.) This does not militate against the right to con1plete the foreclosure aetion.
However, appellants quote from a :Minnesota case and
a South Dakota case. F~'"\hese excerpts it is indieail'd
that the action falls if the lien expires during the pendency of the action. Without knowing nwre of the context, without a statement of the particular facts, and
without knowledge of the pertinent statutes, the excer·pts are of little value. This would seem to he particularly true in the Minnesota case as the lien period
therein mentioned expired on June 3, 1880. lt ahw
appears frorn the excerpt that the particular action wat'
in aid of the execution issued in connection with a clto:'P
in action. Furthennore, in quoting the :--;tatutP, t h~
statement
isLaw that
a judginent
slmll
survive
for
ten Services
Sponsored
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11
The rt'f"prenee i:3 not to a judgment lien. In the

South Dakota ea~e, it does not appear from the mferpt
that any action

wa~

t1

filed.

The referelice is rnerely to

·'The filing of a notice of action''.
In any event, there i~ no showing that any of the
other states had ~tatutes ~irnilar to the Utah statutes
here under consideration. Furthermore, in Nelson v.
Jorqcnsuu, :2-±:2 P. 9-±5, this Court had.under consideration a ease which, afthough the opinion does not state
whether a judgrnent lien was involved, respondent
assumes had reference to such 'a judgment. The plaintiff
therein had obtained a judg1uent on October 15, 1914,
and on October 16, 1922, had instituted an action founded
upon the 191-± judgrnent. The question was whether
a demurrer which was sustained, ''presumably on the
ground that it appeared frorn the face of the complaint
that the cause of action was barred by the statute of
limitations", had properly been sustained. This Court
held that it had not because the last day of the eight
years fell on Sunday and the cornplaint was filed the
next day and, therefore, on time. If the plaintiff's
judgment had becorne a lien, and if an action falls
when the lien expires, it would seern to have been an
idle act of this Court to have held as it did. According
to appellants' contention the proper holding would hav~
be!:'n that, although the action was filed in time,
there was no use considering the question because it
lmd become 11100t clue to the fact that the lien had expirerl.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Tf there was no

pn>pPrt~- a;2;aim;t

wltieh tlw judg-

ltJPnt had beeome a lien, then no lien <·ould expire during
the pendene~- of the action and the aetion would not
fall. r:rhis would lead to the ridieulous ~onclusion that
one witJt a judgment that \va:-; not a lien would be in a.
better position than one with a judgment that was a
lien. It would also be difficult to Pxplain why one
whose judgment did not <·onstitute a lien would be allowed to prosecute hi~ adion to judgment while the
judgment lien ereditor would not. And would the newlyacquired judgment of the creditor who had no previou~
lien attach to any real propert~- ac<tuired hy the jud~·
ment debtor within eight years after the new judgment J?
~\pparentl~- it would, thus again ~tre~sing the inconsistenc~' that would result if it were true a~ contended
h~- appellants that the act~'1n in the instant case becamP
a nullity on Septe1nber 28, 1946. l\roreover, 104-37-n
would give a judgment lien creditor \vho ::;eeks to

enforce his judg1nent after ei_rJht years rights which
would be denied to him if he connnell(·ed his action
within eight years.
r:rhe Supreme Court of California had o<·<·n:-;wn m
1!)03 to re\'iew a case where the facts wc>re quite similar
to the case at bar. The Court 111ade the follo\\-ing Jwrtinent

statement~.

The

qne~tion i~:

''would the lien of the bank exi~t at the time
the land was ordered sold, November 19, 1900,
two ~-Pars and one month after tlw Ii<>n atta<·herl,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or \Yhen

~old.,

:\1 a~· 4, 1901

.. The petition to sell tlw land to Prd'o I'<'P payrnent of the

bank'~

before the two

dain1 and tlw lien was filed

Year~

limitation had <'Xpired.

and lwd flu' effect to arrest it.s furfh('r oper-

ation, even if it l><' conceded that it wm; running
again~ t

the lien. " (In Re \ Viley 's Estate, 71

P . .J.-!1.)
\\'"P do not find that this case has been overruled.

'rhere \Yould seen1 to be no doubt that the decision
of the Suprente Court of California, based upon statutGs
which are not only similar to the Utah statutes but anthe forerunner~ thereof, is nwre indicative of the rule
thi~ Court has followed and should follow. In fact, it
i~ respondent's belief that this Court has already indicated hy its decisions in the Jorgenson and Farnworth
<'a~e~ that it would not construe 104-2-21 to pennit the
filing of an action to foreclose a judgrnent at any tirne
within eight years after the docketing of the judgment
and at the same time hold that to be effective not only
must the action be cornmenced withjn the eight years
but must have proceeded to judgn1ent and sale. The
efl'ed of thi~ would be to limit the tin1e within which an
effective action upon a judgrnent could be instituted to
a much shorter period than eight years. A judgment
lien erPditor would be for<'e<l to <·oJTP<·tly deterrnine the
tjmp that n1ight hP consmned h~· dilator~' ad~ of the
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defendant, and through the courts, which with Nection

75 of the Bankruptcy Ad might Yery well be more
eight years.

!l!(.tl7

The effect of a u10rtgage foreclosure

demonstrates the correct rule. A mortgage lien expires
when the debt is barred. Nevertheless, if a foreclosure
action is commenced before the debt is barred, the property remains subject to sale under the foreelo~ure
decree. There is no question but that 102-9-11, 'vhich
provides that an action ma:- ht> brought b~- the holdrr
of a mortgage or lien to enforce the same and which refers to the complaint, conteu1plates a foreclosure action.

By Re¢ason Of The Waiver b.lJ Gerald C. TValkc1·
The 8·ubject Propert.lJ Was Not E.rempt

'1-,his aetion is supplementary to respondent's foreclosure action in which the judgrnent here sought to l:>r
foreclosed was rendered. Both actions were instituted
in the san1e court. In the foreclosure action copies of the
note and mortgage signed by Gerald C. Vv alker wen·
attached to and n1ade a part of the complaint. The
following waiver appears in the note:
''Each and every maker and endorser of this
note hereby expressl~· waives the benefit of all
exemptions, homestead rights or otherwise, under the laws of this State, and agrees to pay
same without any offset ·wl~atsot·ver
"
Tilt> 1110rtgage provides:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museuml1erel'~·'
and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

''That they \Vill pay tll<. ' i])(iebtedne::-;s

15
~t'etued

in atTord<lll<.'l' with the tt'I'lllt:; of thi;-:

uwrtgage and the provision8 of said note ... ''
Also: ··The eovenanb and agn·ettH:'lll:..; herei11
contained :-;hall extend to and ht>eome binding
upon the heir~. PXecutors, administrator~, succe~~or~ and as~igll:-; of the uwrtgagor ... ''

By reason of such \\·aiYer, neither Uerald C. \Valker
nor any of the appellants um~' legally prevent the collection of the full indebtedne;:-;~ by clairuing any exeruptions hmnestead or otherwise. The lower court had before
it the records in the foreclosure action, Exhibit C.
Although respondent believes that this is a full
answer to appellants' clairn that the property is exernpt
either as a statutor~· hornestead or as a probate hornB~t~·<HL respondent will :-;how that the property is not
exPmpt under any circmustances.

Tl1e Sttuject Property Was Not EJ;en!JJl Under the Utah
Statutes As The llo;nestead of Gerald C. Walker
Appellants contend that the subject property wa:..;
PX.l·mpt a:::; the homestead of Gerald l vValker and thai
respondent's judgrnent, therefore, never becmne a lien
on the proprty. Appllants state that Gerald C. Walker
at the tiine of his d\ath was a resident of Srnithfie1d,
Ctah, and the head of a farnily. rrhe lower court had
lJt>fore it the fact that Gerald C. \Valker died on or
lwfon_• .Ta11uar~· 1-t, 1946, at El SPgundo, California; that
he h<ul lH'('ll living tlll'l"P at lt>ast since l~l-1~~; that the
1

•
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subject

propert~,

was occupied 1>:' tenants in 1943 and

thereafter; and had been so occupied for some time
prior thereto.
rrhese facts clearly refute appellants' contention in
view of 104-37-16, which provides in part:
•'.K one of such exemptions are for the benefit

of non-residents or persons about to depart
from this state with the intention of removing
their effects therefron1 ... ''
Since the avowed purpose of hmnestead laws is to
exernpt the hmne in which a debtor and his family reside,
there is no doubt but that "non-residents" as used in
the statute means persons who do not live in the state.
This is supported by the fact that ''persons about to
depart from the state with the intention of removing
their effects therefrom" are in the same category as
"non-residents". It is to be noted that onl~, the intention
of re1noving effects is required and not the intention
to establish a legal d01nicile in another place. l n< 1uestionably, Gerald C. Walker who had leased the sub,jee1
property and had lived in California for three or more
years irnmediately preceding his death was a nonresident. r:rhis Court considered this statute in U. 8.
Building and Loan Association 't:. ~liidcale Bonte Fi'nance Corporation, 46 P. 2d 672. Although the Court
expn-.~:-;:-;ly l1eld that the question was not hPI"on· it, the
fact
that
hmnestead
exemptions
arebynot
availabh·
toLibrary
non-Services
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expre~:::-;ly
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n•eognized

n~

was t hP fad

that other important factor::-; n1ust appPar frmn the•
pleadings or proof. 'rhe following i:::-; ctuoted frmn the
opinion:
''The benefits of hmnestead exentptions art•
not available to ·non-residents or person::; about
to depart frou1 this state "·ith the intention ot
renwving their effeeb therefrmn'. R. S. UtaJ1

1933, 104-37-6. A::; to smne of the unit holderi5,
the record is silent as to \vhether they are married or single and as to whether or not they an~
heads of farnilies, or if any of thern are heads
of fmnilies the ntunber in the fmnily. The record is likewise silent as to whether any of the
unit holders have or have not already selected
a homestead and if so the value thereof. Such
being the state of the record before us, it i:-;
ilnpossible to dispose of the unit holden;'
claims of homesteads.''
102-8-1 ha~bearing on this subject. It reads in
part as follows: ''When a person dies, leaving
a surviving wife, husband or minor children.
they shall be entitled to remain in possession
of the hmnestead . . . ''

It would follow that the minor children could not '· reJJiaiH in possession of the homestead'' unless the propert~· was the hmnestead of the decedent and certainly not
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unless the wife and 1ninor children were living

thcre~on

at the tin1e of the deceJ'dent '~ death.

Th Subject P1·operty Was Not Ex:e1npt
As A Probate HomestecLd
If not a statutory hOinestead, appellants eontend
then that it is a probate honwstead, and the:· rely on
101-4-6, which provides that ''A homestead r.t5 provided
by section 1, title Honiesteads, . . . shall be wholl.'·
exe1npt fr01n the paYJnent of the debts of the deeedent
... to be set apart on petition and notice, ... ". The
first question is what hon1estead is provided by 38-0-1
The answer is, lands not exceeding in value the sum
of $2,000 for the head of th.e fmnily, and a further suw
of $750 for the spouse, and $300 for each other memhPr
of the fainily. When a widower, who has not remarried.
dies, as in this case, who is the head of the family entitled to the $2,000 exemption? It can hardly be the
decedent; We must look then to 38-0-5 to see whether
the $2,000 exemption applies. The "head of a family"
is defined as (1) the husband or wife, when the claimant
is married. If "the claimant" was the decedent the
$2,000 exeinption is not available because he was a
widower. Furthermore, he could not have been the
clai1nant because he was a non-resident. There was no
spouse, so, the $750 exemption would not he allailable.
The further definition is (2) "Every person who has
residing with him and under his care and maintenance",
any one or nwre of several relatives. Decedent had
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no1w of them .. rP~iding with him", nor did thP minor,

Harry \\~alker. It i~ subinittP(l. too, that .. residing with
him" eonten1pla tl'~ reside nee in lT tah. lt is nc1t shown
that Harry \Yalker

r~.=·~ided

in Utah and we know that

(h'rald C. \Y alker did not. It would appear that the Inaximmn ntlue that could have been exmnpt and set apart
as a probate l1o1nestead would have been $300. However,
a~ we shall shm\-, no property was ;::;et apart as a probate
homestead.
It would semn that the nwst reasonable construction
of 101-4:~6 is that before a hmnestead of a value equal
to the total of the $2,000 for the head of a family, $750

for the spouse, and $300. for each other person could he
{'Xempt, such hmnestead rnust have been selected by the
deceJident before his death, or, in any event, mus~ have
been property he could have legally selected. It is not
reasonable that, when a rnan and his family nwve to
California and are therefore not entitled to a hmnestead
exemption, his family would be entitled to have propert~·
in r tah set apart as a probate honlestead.
This court has considered the question as to th8
value that rnay be set apart as a probate homestead (In
Ht· ~[ower's Estate, 73 P. 2d. 967). On page 973, the
Court said:
''The basic hmnestead, set apart for the head
of the farnily is $2,000, and an additional allowanee o 1:' $300 for each 1ninor child or other
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dependent. If there be no mmor child or dependent other than the spouse·, the homestead
value is $2,000. If there be no surviving spou:-<:•,
but minor children, one JJt.u~t be considered ({s
head of the famil.LJ for hmneslead purposes in
probate proceedings, so that the $2,000 ma:•
be clairned and set apart as a homestead, and
for each additional minor child a further :.;um
of $300 would be set apart as part of the homestead, together with the exempt personal property."
Concededly, this conclusion was arrived at through a
liberal interpretation and was n1ade possible because
in said case there were two on more rninor children.
Since 38-0-5 conternplates that there could not be a
head of a family unless there were two or more persons
involved, it follows that in the instant case with but
the one minor, the conclusion reached in the ]1 ower case
cannot be reached in the case at bar. In Zttniga 1:. E 1;ans,
48 P. 2d 513, this Court held that a widower, all of whosP.
children had attained n1ajorit~· and were not dependfnt
upon hirn was not entitled to a homestead exemption a~
the head of a family.
As a further indication as to what ''homestead a~
provided in section 1, title Hon1esteads '' i~ exempt under
101--±-G, attention is called to the provision in tlw 1'tah
Constitution on the subject. A l'tiel<> XXT l, St>dion ~
provides
inLawpart
"The
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by law, for the ,-.:electioll b~· Paelt head of a famii,IJ. an
exemption of a
The

howP~tP:.Hi

Legi~lature ~eem~

cei'tain extent.
~tatnte~

~~~-0-ti

... from :-:alP on exeeution ".

to have complied at least to a
and

;~~-0-~.

whirh an· the

onl~·

pertaining to selection-disn·garding 38-0-10

for the time heing-n::-;e the \Yords ''selected'' and
":.;Pled". However. it appear::-; that thi~ Court ha~

38-0-10,
12 provides for the declaration of a hornestead and the
recordation thereof, but further provide that a failure
to make ~uch declaration ~hould not irnpair the hornestead right. It i:-: interesting to note that the Legisla·
ture in 19-±7 redrafted 38-0-10 in such a rnanner that
there is no longer an~· question but that the homestead
must be selected and a declaration thereof recorded in
order that it ::;hall be effective as an exernption. rehe
:::;ection no\\· reads as follows :

held that an actual selectiull is not necessary.

''The homestead must be

~elected

and clainted

by the hon1estead claimant by rnaking, signing
and acknowledging a declaration of homestead
as provided in Seetion 38-0-11, lTtah Code Annotated 1943, which declaration rnust, before
the time stated in the notice of sale on execution,
or on other judicial sale, as the tirne of sale, of
prernises in which the hornestead is claimed~
be delivered to and served upon the sheriff or
other offiet>r eonducting the sale or recorded
a:-: provided in Section 38-0-1:2, lTtah Code AnSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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notated 1943. If no such claim is filed or served
as herein provided, title shall pass to purchaser
at such sale free and clear of all homestearl
rights''.
There is no indication that the decendent as a head
of a family ever selected the subjed property as a
hmnestead. Not only has Harry \V alker not selected
the property as a homestead, but he is not the head of
a fanlily and, therefore, is not legally entitled to select
it. Even if he were, his selection thereof would not
take priority over respondent's judgment lien. 104.
37-16 reads in part as follows:
''No article or speeies of pro pert~· mention in
the title Hon1esteads is exernpt from execution
issued upon a judgment recovered for ... ~
or upon a judgment on foreclosure of a mortgage or other valid lien thereon . . . ''.
The Subject Property Was Distributed Subject To
Respondent's Lien.

Notwithstanding the pendency of tnis action, the
ad1ninistrator of the. Estate of Gerald C. Walker petitioned the Probate Court for summary and final distribution of the estate. On December 28, 1946, the
subject property was distributed to Harry \Valker.
It is submitted that the property was distributed to
H arr~; Walker subject to respondent's lien If there
was
intention
on the
part provided
of the
st>tServices
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apart

e~tate::'

when• the whole Yalue does not

$1;,ou. free and clear of all
lien:;, :::mch
holder~

dra~tie

would be

morf!!O/JeS a11d jwl.(JJJicul

interference with the

~tated

<'X<'t><·~l

rightt-~

of lit>n

affirn1atiYd)· nnd would not be

taken by 1nere mnission. In other t-~tate::s the statute~
pertaining to surmnar)· adntinistration are rnore explicit
and t'how affinnatiYely that the property thus set apart
i~ subject to valid liens Of necessity, this would seeut
to be the law, othen,·ise there would be a taking of property without due process of law, and at that, by mere
implication.
There is no doubt but that under 102-8-2 the Court
may properly set apart a probate hmnestead subject to
ntlid liens. However, the section does not pretend to
create probate homesteads. 101-4-6 is the only section
under which a probate homestead can be created or designated and set apart. This section provides however
that the probate homestead is ''to be set apart on petition and notice'·. No petition was filed by the minor
for the purpose of having a probate hmnestead determined and set apart, no notice pertaining to a probah·
homestead was ever given and no order was ever made
h~· the Probate Court setting any property apart as a
probate hmnestead. It is submitted that if propert~·
i~ to be distributed under surnmary administration
subject to a probate homestead, such homestead must
have been "set apart on petition and notieP" prior to
di~triLution. Sot having been done in the ('.clt-~P at bar,
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HaiT~·

Walker is in no position to claim that the sub.
ject property i~ exempt as a probate homestead and
the judg1nent of the lower ('ourt should be affirmed.
This Court has held that existing liens on land
cannot be defeated h~, subsequent declaration of homestead, Mcll:furdie v. Clrug,r;, 107 P. 2d 163. And in detennining the net value of the homestead, subsisting
liens and encumbrances are to he deducted, Crosb:tJ Ji •
.11 nderson, 162 P. 75.

ReszJectfully sttb/}/ittcd,
f(IC#A-1?0

W.

YOfl#t;..

BULLmN & BELL
Attorney:) for Respondc1lf
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